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Abstract—With Ethernet as an ubiquitous technology
also emerging in industrial networks, security is becoming
one of the most important aspects. Whereas IT-networks
together with their security features in the office domain
are subject of a dynamic change, networks in the in-
dustrial environment have a long operational time and
therefore are more vulnerable to unauthorized access
due to outdated hard- and software components. IT-
threats such as Stuxnet are targeted to these areas and
in the case of a failure of, e.g., a critical infrastructure
this can directly harm the public security. Hence, in
this paper a concept of an embedded plug-in device is
proposed that secures the authentication and integrity
of communication flows between two communicating
network parties. A key focus of the development is the
message authentication mechanism without neglecting the
safety aspect imperative for industrial networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of data communication and the fact of
increasing networking in all aspects of life require
more sophisticated security considerations for future
electronic systems. Successful attacks are becoming
more frequent due to a growing spectrum of attack vec-
tors. Because of the omnipresent usage of automation
in critical infrastructure it is a matter of fact that attacks
directed to those systems can cause severe damage to
public and economic [1].
The wish for continuous networking including con-
nectivity to the internet required new ways of thinking.
A possible approach is the combination of (formerly)
proprietary systems with standard information technol-
ogy such as the internet protocol family. This change
to open technologies, for instance Ethernet or TCP/IP,
enabled high transmission capacity and a device con-
nectivity from field- to management-level [2]. The term
Industrie 4.0 describes not only the combination of pro-
duction processes with information technology but also
the internetworking with classical IT office networks.
Industry, energy, transport, private environment: the
infrastructures are growing together [3]. The increasing
degree of connection associated with a rise of cyber
attacks creates a demand for sophisticated security
solutions [4]. Security by design is not always possible.
Reasons for this are the long operational time of plants
and a plurality of interlocking legacy-infrastructures.
Further IT-systems are often evaluated after the imple-
mentation and are supplemented with security solutions
afterwards or replaced by new secure technologies,
e.g., the Siemens Industrial Security concept [5]. Such
solutions are accompanied with a high financial effort
for operating companies and are therefore often not
desirable.
Obviously, e.g., for industrial legacy-systems a dif-
ferent approach and methodology to secure commu-
nication between network parties must be elaborated.
Thus, an embedded plug-in device will be described in
this work that satisfies this requirement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II gives an overview of related concepts to this
work. Section III briefly describes the requirements
for secure communication. Section IV provides the
proposed security concept including the algorithms and
modules necessary for securing communication flows.
Section V presents a proof of concept with a related
evaluation and section VI finalizes the paper with a
short conclusion and a glance at future work of the
ongoing research work.
II. RELATED RESEARCH WORK
A concept of a software independent solution for
Ethernet LAN security is presented in [6] by intro-
ducing a hardware device utilized between a protected
host and the network. Data through the network is
transmitted under encryption and can only be decrypted
by the intended recipients hardware device. An appro-
priate key management system is described in order
to use a one-time-pad encryption based on DES. The
concept of such a SECURCOM device has further been
implemented and is restricted to be used within one
security domain meaning the transmission of packets
to different subnets is not possible.
The Open Source CRYpto-Bridge (OSCRYB) for se-
cure Ethernet point-to-point industrial communications
was presented in [7]. Two secure Ethernet networks
each containing an Ethernet device can be connected
through two OSCRYB devices. If Ethernet frames
match predefined MAC addresses, they are processed
including an on-the-fly encryption using AES per-
formed through a SEC core. Otherwise the frames will
be forwarded transparently. Further implementation of
the SEC core to a scalable 128-bit AES-CM crypto-
core is presented in [8].
A secure communication protocol implemented on
ZYBO Zynq-7000 development boards has been pre-
sented in [9]. Input data from users are passed to a
FPGA and then sent over the internet to the corre-
sponding communication partner. The proposed tech-
nology separates the communication area (inside the
ARM) from the cryptographic one (inside the FPGA)
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in which an AES algorithm along with a cryptograhpic
co-processor for data integrity algorithms is applied.
The mentioned approaches encrypt the data on-the-
fly which causes a considerable delay to the network
traffic. Therefore the transmission of time critical data
especially needed in industrial control applications is
hardly feasible. Modifying packets through encryption
and decryption could also be a safety related problem.
If the processes fail, packets are not guaranteed to
arrive deterministically at their predefined destination.
III. SECURITY CONCERNS OF AUTOMATION
COMMUNICATION
In this context two network participants communi-
cate secure when the protection goals of exchanged
information Authentication, Confidentiality and In-
tegrity are complied. Within industrial automation the
protection goals are almost identical but in contrast
to conventional IT systems the priority is given to
Availability and Integrity. IT security concepts, e.g.,
IPsec, SSL/TLS and VPN are mainly directed to the
IT domain and cannot be trivially mapped to the
industrial automation [10]. For instance, this is because
some protocols require to meet timing constraints.
In addition many embedded devices are applied only
providing limited system resources in terms of memory
and computational power.
Network participants intending to communicate se-
curely must prove their identity which could be
achieved by utilizing a public key infrastructure. Con-
fidentiality could be provided for instance through
encryption mechanisms and digital signature schemes
or applied hash functions could preserve the integrity
of information. However, deployed cryptographic tech-
niques are computationally intensive and must not
exceed the available device resources [10].
The proposed embedded plug-in device of this work
provides integrity through HMACs for messages which
are flowing transparently through the device. Identifi-
cation is given through a combination of the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange based on certificates with a plat-
form integrity verification in conjunction with a direct
attestation step. In order to not forfeit the availability
criterion the embedded plug-in device is not modifying
the original network messages. The HMAC algorithm
is applied on-the-fly without interfering the actual
information. Confidentiality, e.g., through encryption
is not required for many protocols since it only delays
the network messages which results in a considerable
computation time which is not intended within the
protocol standards.
IV. PROPOSED SECURITY CONCEPT
Ensuring authentic network communication is ob-
tained through embedded plug-in devices. A simplified
network communication contains two end devices (A
and B) which are connected to a network. All devices
are located in the same subnet. End device A and
B having a communication relationship, meaning that
A sends messages to B (mA→B) and B is sending
messages to A (mB → A). The simple network relation
is extended by two embedded plug-in devices C and
D in a way that the messages between A and B
can be authenticated. Figure 1 shows a basic scenario.
The normal network communication stays untouched,
meaning that A sends messages to B (mA→ B) and
B is sending messages to A (mB → A) without C
and D interfering. On C and D an Ethernet bridge is
implemented combining the two Ethernet interfaces to
transparently forward network traffic. The main task
of the embedded plug-in devices is to generate and
verify HMACs for the messages of the end devices
passing through the bridge interface, depending on
defined policies.
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Fig. 1. Basic Scenario of the Conception
In this simple scenario C listens to the Ethernet
interface to which A is connected. Depending on
the rules defined in C Message Authentication Codes
(HMAC(mA→ B)) will be generated for messages
which will be sent from end device A to end device B
(mA→B). The HMAC(mA→ B) will be sent to and
verified by D subsequently over the Ethernet interface
connected to the network. For the creation of these
authentication values both embedded plug-in devices
C and D must first agree on a common secret. In
the opposite communication direction D listens to
the Ethernet interface to which B is connected and
generates HMAC(mB → A) which will also be sent
to and verified by the embedded plug-in device C.
A. Authenticated Boot
In order to ensure the integrity of hard- and
software of the embedded plug-in device, an addi-
tional hardware-based security architecture as pre-
sented in [11] is applied as an integral part of the
platform. Thus, a hardware chip, the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) will be used to secure the boot stages
in which the process contains alternating measurement
and execution flows on every consecutive boot step.
Hence, a chain of trust can be established ranging from
the first bootloader up to the application code.
B. Direct Attestation
Apart from verifying the authenticity of the com-
municating embedded plug-in devices, it is of interest
if the communicating party is trustworthy regarding
its hard- and software integrity. Since the mentioned
authenticated boot process is used for verification of
the integrity of hard- and software of an embedded
plug-in device, this information can be used to authen-
ticate its integrity to the communicating plug-in device.
For this a special TPM key type is employed: The
Attestation Identity Key (AIK). Apart from the unique
Endorsement Key (EK) representing the identity of the
platform the AIKs are created by the TPM and linked
to the platform using certificates from the EK. The
AIK can be used for signing purposes of the current
configuration (soft- and hardware) of the platform
which is stored in terms of integrity fingerprints in the
Platform Configuration Register (PCR) of a TPM.
With this concept two communicating embedded
plug-in devices are able to verify its opposites hard-
and software integrity. Based on this trust, a key
agreement protocol can be performed as to obtain a
common secret between two embedded plug-in devices
in order to compute the Message Authentication Codes.
C. Key Establishment
The key establishment between two communicat-
ing embedded plug-in devices using an unsecured
channel is performed by applying the well known
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol as a basis.
However, this scheme does not authenticate the enti-
ties involved and thus suffers from man-in-the-middle
attacks [12]. Therefore, a key agreement scheme as
shown in figure 2 has been implemented such that
the authentication is anchored on certificates. The
CA hierarchy in this example contains the certificates
for two embedded plug-in devices UserA / UserB
labeled as certA / certB which were certified by the
root CA (certCA).
User A
certCA, certA, 
TPM_sealed(RSApriv-A), p, g, a
certCA, certB, 
TPM_sealed(RSApriv-B), b
Root-CA
certCA
 certA certBRSApriv-A RSApriv-B
RSApriv-CA
e, B
TPM_unseal(RSApriv-A)
verify(certB, certCA)
A = ga mod p
s = RSA_sign(SHA(p||g||A), 
RSApriv-A)
K = Ba mod p
RSA_verify(AES_decrypt( e, 
SHA(K)), certB)
User B
verify(certA, certCA)
TPM_unseal(RSApriv-B)
RSA_verify(s, certA)
B = gb mod p
K = Ab mod p
e = AES_encrypt(RSA_sign( 
SHA(A||B), RSApriv-B), SHA(K))
Fig. 2. Modified Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
Before the actual key exchange starts, the two com-
municating parties verify each others certificates. For
security reasons the private RSA signing keys are not
desired to be stored on the embedded plug-in device’s
disk, since an attacker might compromise the platform
and read out the private key. Thus, the TPM sealing
functionality has been utilized in which the private key
has been sealed previously in a trustworthy environ-
ment based on its hard- and software condition. The
actual DH key exchange starts by UserA computing
the public DH key A using a large prime p, a generator
g and a chosen private DH key a. Finding a large
prime p and check whether g is a generator takes
considerable time. Thus, a list of pre-calculated sets
of p and g pairs are stored on UserA′s platform.
The list gets updated every time a pair has been taken
from the list. A concatenation of p, g and A will be
hashed, e.g., using the SHA-256 algorithm. The result
will be signed by RSApriv-A, yielding the signature s.
The set of parameters p, g, A and s is then sent to
UserB, which will verify the signature under usage of
UserA′s certificate certA. UserB is able to compute
his public DH key B and the common secret K by
the received parameters A, p and his chosen private
DH key b. In order to ensure that both communicating
parties compute the same common secret, UserB is
encrypting a signature containing the concatenation of
the public DH keys A and B with the common secret
K yielding e. The cipher e and B will be transmitted
to UserA which is able to compute the common secret
K. Whether the computation has been correct can
be checked by first decrypting the cipher e using K
and then verifying the result with certB . Since every
time two embedded plug-in devices negotiate a new
common secret K, Forward Secrecy (FS) is given.
D. Architecture
In the concept each embedded plug-in device is
based on an architecture as shown in figure 3. Two
Ethernet interfaces are bridged together (br0) in order
to transparently forward network traffic from an end
device (attached to eth0) to the network (attached to
eth1) and vice versa. While packets are forwarded over
the bridge, the Capturing Module is responsible to filter
and process these packets according to predefined rules
as well as forwarding them to the HMAC Generation
module.
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Fig. 3. Architecture of an Embedded Plug-In Device
HMACs will be computed by the HMAC Generation
module using a previously negotiated common secret
through the Communication Module. These HMACs
are afterwards sent to the communicating embedded
plug-in device within the network. Incoming packets
from the network will be forwarded by the bridge
br0 but will also be subject to the Capturing Module.
Then, the generated HMACs are stored in the HMAC
Storage. If the hashes are received by the Commu-
nication Module from the communicating embedded
plug-in devices within the network, they are supplied
to the HMAC Matching module. It checks whether the
computed HMAC and the received one are equal or
not.
The Control & Management module is responsible
for negotiating with communicating embedded plug-in
devices how many packets and the point in time when
packets shall be subjected to the HMAC generation.
This reduces the network traffic and based on the
frequency as well as number of computations the level
of security can be adjusted. By utilizing for instance a
time controlled counter approach, the module ensures
that packets have not been dropped or replayed. Further
the module can be used to send information about
packets to an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or to
inform an administrator about mismatching HMACs.
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT
The embedded plug-in devices have been imple-
mented using Terasic DE1-SoC Boards. An Ethernet
extension card is used to connect two additional Eth-
ernet PHYs through FPGA logic to the Hard Processor
System (HPS) running an embedded Linux.
The bridging mechanism has been implemented by
applying the bridging utility provided by the open
source virtual switch Open vSwitch. The software
supports forwarding of Bridge Protocol Data Units
(BPDUs) frames. Thus, it could also be used together
with layer-2 protocols, for instance PROFINET IO.
PF RING is a high speed packet capture library suit-
able for both packet and active traffic analysis and
manipulation and provides a new socket type that
can directly call a ring to read and write data [13].
Two of such rings are used to independently capture
packets from the interfaces eth0 as well as eth1 and
pass them to the Linux user space for HMAC gen-
eration/verification. The key establishment as well as
the HMAC algorithm schemes have been implemented
using functions from the open source library OpenSSL.
A simple scenario as shown in figure 1 has been
set up. The ICMP and BACnet protocol in which end
device A sends, e.g., simple BACnet packets to B has
been used for proving the concept. A simple network
router acts as a network infrastructure.
The forwarding latency of a packet can be deter-
mined by performing ping-commands between two
devices using the ICMP protocol. In a first attempt a di-
rect connection between the devices is applied and in a
second an embedded plug-in device is interconnected.
The difference in time for the ICMP packets to be sent
out and received will be determined and its mean value
of 10000 measurements yields the forwarding latency
of 38.10 µs for a packet size of 98 bytes. A second
approach utilizes the tool SignalTap II Logic Analyzer,
in which the latency could be determined to 38.57 µs
for the same packet size.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
With upcoming Industrie 4.0 compliances, it is
mandatory to develop security mechanisms for protect-
ing industrial network infrastructures prone to security
attacks. An approach to verify message integrity from
authenticated network parties utilizing embedded plug-
in devices has been delineated in this work in order to
secure network connections.
Compared to similar approaches the presented con-
cept allows security without impacting the actual traffic
flow by decapsulating HMACs from their original
packets. On-the-fly modification of network traffic, as
is the case for encryption schemes, has a consider-
able delay impact on the transferred data. Encrypting
64 byte with the solution presented in [9] will take
approximately 800 ns. Transmitting time and safety
critical data could lead to safety issues if encryption
or decryption fails. Thus, it is inevitable for industrial
networks field level protocols, especially afflicted to
meet timing requirements, e.g., PROFINET IRT, that
the embedded plug-in devices are transparent in terms
of not delaying packets. For a further work it is
desirable to reduce the measured forwarding delay by
implementing the bridging and hashing mechanism in
hardware with the help of FPGAs since over 95 %
of the delay is attributable to the applied embedded
Linux.
The ongoing work will focus on extending the com-
munication infrastructure to multiple embedded plug-
in devices. Thus, automatically inserting and removing
embedded plug-in devices in an existing infrastruc-
ture with regard to handling failures needs to be
investigated. In the implementation of the proof of
concept the Control & Management module has been
neglected. The implementation of this will be content
of future investigation. A feature for instance utilizing
timestamps or a counter based approach is crucial in
order to counteract, e.g., replay attacks in industrial
networks.
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